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1 Introduction 
 
Recent shortcomings in corporate affairs, related to the 
Global Financial Crisis, have shown how related party 
transactions (RPTs), in many cases, played a prime role in  
abuse. This forced regulators to strengthen the rules, 
introducing new bans and imposing new requirements 
aimed at guaranteeing the substantive and economic 
fairness of related party transactions (RPTs). The reforms 
have focused on two main areas, approval processes and  
increasing transparency. From a theoretical perspective, 
RPTs are studied according to two different perspectives: 
conflict of interest and the efficient transaction 
hypothesis. 
The first supports the idea that these transactions 
represent a conflict of interest and conflict with forms of 
company and investor protection (Emshwiller 2003). The 
conflict of interest theory claims that RPTs may in 
general be an instrument of abuse in relation to two 
opposing groups: ownership and control (executive 
directors and management), or majority and minority 
shareholders.  
In opposition to this, the efficient transaction 
hypothesis assumes that RPTs are sound business 
exchanges, efficiently fulfilling the underlying economic 
needs of the corporation (Pizzo 2011), because the 
reduction of information asymmetry reduces transaction 
costs and risks.  The theories coexist and hence RPTs 
cannot be banned. 
In line with the conflict of interest theory, our study 
aims to analyze relations between revenues made with 
RPTs (Related Revenues) and  corporate economic 
trends.  
Excluding banks, in Italy subject to specific rules, 
we examined the 100 highest capitalized Italian 
companies listed in 2011. The focus is on Italy because of 
the strong interrelation between Italian listed companies 
(as elsewhere in Europe). The relations involve intra-
group entities as well as extra-group entities. In particular, 
the Italian listed corporate sector is characterized by 
concentrated control (Bianchi & Bianco 2006) through 
opaque structures, such as pyramids, dominated by a 
small number of interlinked but competing entrepreneurs 
(Assonime 2011). Italian companies generally have  a 
controlling owner (Bianchi et al. 2001),  hence the 
relevance of the topic in the Italian context because of the 
exposure of minority shareholders to a high risk of 
exploitation (Nenova 2003, Dyck and Zingales 2004).  
As Holderness (2009) says, minority control is a 
widespread and constant issue the world over, in different 
forms and modes. Data was collected in part from the 
AIDA database (Bureau van Dijk S.p.a) and in part from 
Financial Statements. Pursuant to Consob Resolution  
15519/2006, companies must  declare the revenues and 
costs produced with RPTs in their Income Statements, as 
well as related receivables and liabilities in the Financial 
Statements. The data was checked with information set 
out  in the Supplementary Notes to the Financial 
Statements, as required by IAS 24, which disclose details 
regarding related parties. 
In the literature, the improper use of RPTs has been 
found to affect future performance as well as corporate 
values in China (Chen et al. 2011; Zhu and Zhu 2012) and 
the U.S. (Ryngaert and Thomas 2012; Kohlbeck and 
Mayhew 2010). Some studies indicate a positive relation 
between RPTs and corporate performance, through 
increasing sales or lower transaction costs (Khanna and 
Palepu 1997, Chen et al. 2012), whereas other studies 
support the evidence that there is a negative association 
between RPTs and performance, Tobin’s q ratio and ROA 
(Munir & Gul 2011), or ROE (Cheung et al. 2009). Via 
an OLS model, this research aims to contribute to the 
literature on RPTs by providing evidence to justify 
increasingly expensive and mandatory regulation. Results 
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show that the intensity of related party revenues is higher 
when a company has suffered a reduction in profitability 
as well as in turnover. Whereas, there is no evidence of 
inverse relations between related party revenues and the 
financial position of the company. This provides input for 
future research to implement our analysis taking the 
financial dimension into account. 
 
2 Review of rpts in the literature 
 
The sequence of corporate scandals (Enron, Arthur 
Andersen, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco International and 
Parmalat) that shook up financial markets at the 
beginning of the new millennium has fueled a debate on 
Corporate Governance (CG). To understand its 
importance, it is necessary to clearly establish the purpose 
of a corporation. As Stout (2013) and many other authors 
(Clark 2013, Stevelman 2013, Weinstein 2013) argue, the 
corporate form may meet the needs of many different 
groups of entities. One of the most widespread theories is 
the maximization of shareholder value based on the 
difficult issue of resolving conflicts between the 
ownership and other stakeholders. In this sense CG rules 
aim to put shareholder interests before those of Directors 
(Agency theory) and stakeholders. Hence RPTs can play a 
positive role in helping companies to reach their 
shareholder targets. This rules out banning them 
altogether (Goshen 2003). However, they can be used to 
generate abuses against various other types of entity in 
corporate life. RPTs can reduce the problem of 
asymmetric information between outside stakeholders 
(including investors) and corporate management (Gordon 
et al. 2004), partly because of the conflict of interest that 
can arise among shareholders.   
For this reason, CG is expected to reduce the 
opportunistic behavior of management, to improve the 
quality of corporate reporting, and to increase corporate 
performance (Chen et al. 2009, Bhagat and Bolton 2008, 
Denis and McConnell 2003). At the same time, it restrains 
(diminishes) opportunistic uses of discretionary accruals 
in a company’s Financial Statements (Chung et al. 2002 
and Park and Shin 2004), inter-group borrowings 
(Berkman et al. 2009), and corporate fraud (Chen et al. 
2006).  
In the Shareholder Value Myth, Stout (2013) shows 
how the traditional managerial focus on  shareholder 
interest can be harmful to the corporation. He suggests a 
more long-term perspective that does not reward a small 
subset of shareholders, which is shortsighted, 
opportunistic, undiversified, and indifferent to ethics and 
the welfare of others. Furthermore, as Biondi (2005) 
suggests, the accounting system can be deemed the heart 
of the business corporation and can replace or 
complement the market price. A method based on 
accounting reporting is better able to represent and 
control the relationship between shareholders and the 
business corporation (Biondi 2012). 
Due to this, CG rules must regulate the assessment 
process and approval of RPTs and improve the efficiency 
and quality of financial reporting (Razaee 2004). This 
would limit the improper use of RPTs and foster the 
disclosure of the information required to assess these 
transactions (Fooladi et al. 2011).  
As with CG, RPTs are  strongly influenced by the 
type of culture to which they are applied. Hoftede (1980) 
points to the large cultural differences between countries 
to explain the very varied  approaches adopted. and the 
many different types of CG models and rules. Globally, 
three leading forms of capitalism can be identified: the 
Anglo-Saxon, the Teutonic and the Latin. Their most 
significant differences are generally the result of  
differences in culture although there are other elements 
that influence CG variables. Despite the globalization 
process which is fostering unification of the models in 
many counties, significant differences remain regarding 
ownership structure and corporate control. In particular, 
many studies focus on the relationship between ownership 
structure (Zengquan et al. 2004, Kun 2005, Jian & Tak 
2010, Munir 2010), the role played by the stock market 
(Gordon et al. 2004, Lo et al. 2010, Yeh et al. 2012) and 
the quality and relevance of RPTs in corporate life. 
Cernat (2004) argues that CG constitutes not only a 
crucial difference between varieties of capitalism but is 
also a major factor in determining their economic 
performance. Chen (2014) found that the financial crisis 
has triggered a need for companies to adopt a new 
governance structure in order to better cope with the 
challenges of the environment. However, as yet, the 
literature on RPTs has not paid sufficient attention to the 
relationship between CG and RPT disclosure, although 
the knowledge of these transactions can affect the way in 
which analysts of Financial Statements assess the 
performance, financial position, and risk and 
opportunities of an entity (Corlaciu and Tudor 2011). 
Current rules on RPTs must be revised and improved 
because of a lack of efficiency (Gromis di Trana 2014, 
Bava and Gromis di Trana 2015). 
Two definitions of RPTs are commonly used (Chen-
Wen & Chinshun 2007) in business literature. 
The first is that RPTs are generically defined as 
transactions between a company and related entities (e.g., 
subsidiaries, affiliates, principal owners, officers, and 
directors) (FASB 1982). Young (2005) suggests a second 
definition that sees them as «transactions between a 
company and an insider», i.e. a person considered to be 
part of the company (Pan & Hsiu-Cheng 2007). The 
common element is the relationship between the parties 
which can influence and establish the binding conditions 
of the contract (implicitly or explicitly), which differ from 
other contracts because the parties are not independent.  
One of the most influential and widespread 
definitions is provided by International Accounting 
Standards which define RPTs as a «transfer of resources, 
services or obligations between a reporting entity and a 
related party, regardless of whether a price is charged» 
(IAS 24), and where «a related party is a person or entity 
that is related to the entity that is preparing its financial 
statements» (IAS 24). Two or more parties are considered 
to be related, whether companies or individuals, when one 
has the ability to influence the other in making 
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operational or financial decisions. Furthermore, 
International Accounting Standards state that related 
entities are members of the same group (which means that 
parent companies, subsidiaries and fellow subsidiaries are 
all related to each other), including where the entity, or 
any member of a group, provides key management 
personnel services to the reporting entity or to the parent 
of the reporting entity. The latter provision was added by 
Annual Improvements to the IFRSs 2010–2012 Cycle, 
taking effect for annual periods from 1 July 2014. This 
version does not deem two entities related simply because 
they have a director or key manager in common. Hence,  
RPTs can be observed through different perspectives, one 
that puts the risks before the advantages produced by 
these transactions, and the other which highlights their 
natural tendency to reduce monitoring costs and 
information asymmetry.   
 
From a theoretical perspective, RPTs are studied in 
light of: 
(a) conflicts of interest; 
(b) the efficient transaction hypothesis. 
 
Lemmon and Lins (2003) suggest that the 
corporation ownership structure is what principally 
determines the extent of agency problems between 
controlling insiders and outside investors. The insiders 
able to control corporate assets can potentially expropriate 
outside investors by diverting resources for their personal 
use or by committing funds to unprofitable projects that 
provide private benefits. Further, Grossman and Hart 
(1980) showed that if a corporation has a broad 
shareholder base, no single shareholder has adequate 
incentives to monitor management closely. In this context 
the transfer price can favor the controlling or related party 
at the expense of minority shareholders (Johnson et al. 
2000). Therefore it is important to guarantee adequate 
legal process to protect minorities and small investors. La 
Porta et al. (1998) argue that the absence of strong legal 
protection and other external governance mechanisms 
further increases the severity of agency problems between 
controlling insiders and outside investors.  
Based on these assumptions, the first theory supports 
the idea that these transactions are a conflict of interest 
and also conflict with company and investor protection 
(Emshwiller 2003). The  theory claims that RPTs may in 
general generate abuse due to the opposing interests of 
ownership and control (executive directors and 
management), or of majority and minority shareholders.  
The first conflict is examined by Agency Theory 
literature (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama 1980, 
Eisenhardt 1989), which also deals with the effectiveness 
of monitoring management (Fama and Jensen 1983 1-2). 
The second conflict is sufficiently analyzed in literature as 
an investor protection tool (La Porta et al. 2000). In 
particular, the transactions are subject to moral hazard, i.e. 
a situation where a party tends to take risks because it is 
not liable for any costs incurred. Thus, RPTs can produce 
benefits for the strong party (insiders) at the expense of 
the weak (outsider). The reasons for this discrepancy are 
the lack of tools to protect the minority’s rights and the 
presence of asymmetric information (Beak et al. 2006). 
Some examples of this abuse could lead to a reduction in 
shareholder wealth (tunneling transactions), yielding a 
virtual increase in the resources of the corporation or, 
ultimately, misleading statements (earnings management). 
Some studies (Gordon 2004 et al., Kohlbeck and Mayhew 
2005) conclude that weak corporate governance leads to a 
larger number of RPTs. Several studies have confirmed 
the use of earnings management by large numbers of 
listed companies in order to achieve particular levels of 
ROE (Chen and Yuan 2004, Liu and Lu 2007). The 
manipulation of the process of financial reporting to 
obtain private gain may easily take place through RPTs. 
In contrast with the previous approach, the efficient 
transaction hypothesis assumes that related party 
transactions represent sound business exchanges, 
efficiently fulfilling the underlying economic needs of the 
corporation (Pizzo 2011). The basis of this theory is the 
reduction of transaction costs as well as the reduction of 
the risk associated with these transactions. The conflicts 
of interest theory and the efficient transaction theory are 
not necessarily in opposition, because these transactions 
can produce benefits as well as disadvantages. For this 
reason, as stated by Goshen (2003), a total ban on self-
dealing would be irreconcilable with the goal of 
preserving the performance of efficient transactions. 
Furthermore, a non-interventionist approach would leave 
the investor vulnerable the problem of the conflict of 
interests. 
Related party sales might be an important part in a 
firm’s normal business and contribute as importantly to 
the firm’s performance and return as do non-related party 
sales. However, if related party sales are misused by the 
controlling owner for opportunistic earnings management 
purposes, the credibility and durability of these sales 
numbers are lower than that of non-related party sales, 
which are more difficult to manipulate. 
Finally, a contingency perspective has been 
suggested encompassing both theories (Pizzo 2011). It is 
based  on the fact that method is perfect and can cope 
with all possible cases. 
Some studies suggest that, on average, RPTs are not 
harmful to outside shareholders (Ryngaert & Thomas 
2011). This observation can be extended to the other 
classes of stakeholders (Henry et al. 2007). However a 
high inherent risk exists due to the increased likelihood of 
RPTs being used in fraudulent behavior. In particular, this 
type of transaction tends to increase the discrepancy in 
treatment between those who hold the power and those 
who are subject to it (minority shareholders or 
shareholdings in general). Having said this, it should also 
be noted that most of these transactions are a normal 
feature of business; entities frequently carry out activities 
through subsidiaries, joint control or significant influence, 
and the fact that a corporation conducts a high volume of 
such transactions should not automatically lead to the 
conclusion that something fishy is going on (Gordon et al. 
2007). 
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Numerous studies provide evidence of their role in 
financial crises (Swartz and Watkins 2003; Tague 2004) 
and in achieving specific aims (Erickson et al. 2000); 
others do the opposite, demonstrating how RPTs  played 
no strategic role in corporate scandals (Bell & Carcello 
2000). While the presence of RPTs does not mean 
fraudulent financial reporting, failure to recognize or 
disclose related party transactions was found to be one of 
the top 10 audit deficiencies in the United States by 
Beasleye at al. (2001).  
Regulators reacted by strengthening the existing 
rules, introducing new bans and imposing additional 
statutory requirements, to guarantee stakeholders’ rights.  
This fails to address the fact  that  fraud of this kind 
can be carried out with parties not generally considered  
related parties.  RPTs attract attention due to  their 
inherent risk. Hence regulation cannot exclude a risk 
approach to evaluating the transactions to be disclosed in 
order to identify the proper tradeoff between costs and 
positive effects. 
Business literature has provided ample evidence of 
the consequences of RPTs for a firm’s performance. 
Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2005) suggest that the potential 
benefit or detriment depends on the parties involved in the 
transaction or the type of RPTs carried out. Liu and Liu 
(2007) state that RP sales and purchases are used to 
encourage cooperation among entities and maximize the 
operational efficiency and competitiveness of group 
companies. As a result, RP sales and purchases in China 
improve corporate performance and increase abnormal 
stock returns. Chang and Hong (2000) found that firms  
perform better when the transfers of products and 
managerial expertise within the group increase. Empirical 
evidence shows that Chinese firms with high levels of RP 
loans and guarantees demonstrate significantly poor 
future performance, including sharp declines in 
profitability (Jiang et al. 2010). 
The higher the level of related party purchase 
transactions engaged in by Chinese listed companies, the 
better their financial and market performance (Chen et al. 
2009), but there is also a significant negative relationship 
between related party sales, loans, guarantees, mortgages 
and leases, and market performance. Some studies 
indicate a positive relation between RPTs and corporate 
performance, through increasing sales or reduced 
transaction costs (Khanna and Palepu 1997), whereas 
other studies support the evidence that there is a negative 
association between RPTs and performance, Tobin’s q 
ratio and ROA (Munir & Gul 2011), or ROE (Cheung et 
al. 2009). This type of evaluation is made harder by the 
difficulties in the various activities caused by routine 
versus anomalous transactions (Wong & Ming 2003). For 
this reason, Chen et al. (2012) divided RPTs into normal 
and abnormal. The results show that normal RPTs are 
positively correlated with firm performance (ROA, ROE 
or ROS) and abnormal RPTs negatively correlated. 
Pozzoli and Venuti (2014) conclude that in Italy RPTs 
and ROA are not correlated and there is no evidence of 
cause and effect. Wen-Yi Lin et al. (2010) claim that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether such 
transactions are beneficial or detrimental to organizational 
performance, and this evaluation should be made on a  
case by case basis.  
Other studies evaluate the effect produced by RPTs 
on corporate value. For instance, Kohlbeck & Mayhew 
(2009) found that the market assigns lower values and 
subsequent returns to corporations that engage in certain 
types of RPTs. This study verified the influence that 
corporate performance plays on RP revenues. 
 
3 Research question and sample 
 
3.1 Research question 
 
The aim of our analysis is to verify whether there is an 
association between the intensity of revenues with related 
parties and a firm’s profitability, as well as with trends in 
turnover. Data was collected from Consolidated Financial 
Statements in order to limit the effects produced by  
group size. 
In particular, we were not interested in identifying 
an association between ROI (return on investments), ROE 
(return on equity) and ROA (return on assets), but we 
took into account the effects produced by an increase or a 
reduction in these ratios between 2010 and 2011. The 
reason was that the selected companies operate in 
different sectors characterized by different profitability 
averages. The analysis was also applied to trends  in 
turnover  over the same period.  
 
The following questions were asked: 
 
RQ 1) Is there an association between revenues 
with related parties and corporate profitability? 
 
To identify this correlation we took into account the 
variation of ROI (the ratio between EBIT and Total 
Assets) between 2010 and 2011, since  it shows core 
business profitability, whereas other indicators such as 
ROE and ROA are affected by  extraordinary components 
that may vary without indicating a situation of crisis. A 
positive association may mean that RPTs are efficient and 
can help companies achieve improved economic results. 
On the contrary, a negative association could be a 
warning sign indicating the inherent risk behind the 
transactions. 
 
RQ 2) Is there an association between revenues 
with related parties and trends in turnover? 
 
In the last few years the recession has caused a fall 
in sales in many sectors, one of the main reasons 
companies have stopped generating wealth and have 
started to consume it.  
We wanted to see if companies that increase or 
reduce turnover are more or less involved in carrying out 
revenues with related parties. A statistical association 
between the intensity of related party revenues and an 
increase in turnover may be physiological, whereas an 
association between the intensity of related party 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 13, Issue 1, Autumn  2015, Continued – 2 
 
258 
transactions and a fall in turnover might be a means to 
reduce economic imbalance. 
 
3.2 Sample 
 
The empirical analysis considers the 100 highest 
capitalized Italian listed companies in 2010. Banks were 
excluded for two reasons: firstly the structure of their  
Income Statements differs from other corporations and 
secondly, because in Italy banks are subject to specific 
rules on related party transactions. Appendix 1 sets out 
the list of companies.  
 
3.3 Model design 
 
The model we suggest is innovative and aims to establish 
the relation between the intensity of RPTs and the 
variable selected as the best  indicator of a company’s 
health. 
 
 
I. 
𝑅𝑃𝑅 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖 Δ𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽𝑖𝑖 Δ𝑅𝑂𝐼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖 Δ𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛽𝑖𝑣 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔2011 + 𝜀 
 
The intensity of RP Revenues is the ratio between 
RP revenues and 2011 operating revenues.  Turnover id 
preferred to total asset value because it gives a better 
picture of the company’s market position. Different 
businesses require different investments, which could 
influence the association with other variables taken into 
consideration.  
The ratio is: 
 
II. 
𝑅𝑃𝑅 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
 
 
ΔTurn is the relative increase or decrease in turnover 
between 2011 and 2010. We opted for a ratio in order to 
reduce the effect produced by the difference in size.  
The ratio is: 
 
III. 
Δ𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛 =
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 2011 − 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 2010
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 2010
 
 
ΔROI is the difference between 2011 and 2010 
operating profitability.  ROI (return on investment) is a 
performance measure used to evaluate operating 
profitability. ROI is the ratio between EBIT and Total 
Assets, chosen  because it reflects the core business and is 
not influenced by other variables such as financial 
elements or extraordinary results. 
The formula is: 
 
 
IV. 
Δ𝑅𝑂𝐼 = 𝑅𝑂𝐼 2011 − 𝑅𝑂𝐼 2010 
 
ΔCash is a financial variable that evaluates a firm’s 
financial trends. It shows the difference between Net Cash 
Flow in 2011 and in 2010. It was adopted in order to  
extend the study to the financial dimension.  
The formula is: 
 
V. 
Δ𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ =
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 2011 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 2010
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 2010
 
 
Marg 2011 is the relation between EBITDA and 
Operating revenues in 2011. It is a stock variable, used to 
verify if companies with higher related revenues in 2011 
had higher operating margins in the same year and to test 
whether there is the same relation between profitability 
trends and stock value. 
The formula is: 
 
 
VI. 
Marg 2011 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 2011
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 2011
 
 
4 Results 
 
An OLS linear model was used (Model I) to develop the 
study. All analyses were performed with IBM’s SPSS 
(22). An R
2
 of .378 is low, but can be considered adequate 
because the independent variable is the ratio of related 
revenues to total operating revenues (Table 1). 
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Table 1- Model Summaryb 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square Std. Error Durbin-Watson 
1 .615a .378 .351 .17080 1.775 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ΔTurn, ΔROI, ΔCash, Marg2011. 
b. Dependent Variable: RP Revenue intensity. 
 
Table 2 -ANOVAa 
 
  Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1.634 4 .408 14.001 ,000b 
Residual 2.684 92 .029   
Total 4.318 96    
a. Dependent Variable: RP Revenue intensity. 
b. Predictors: (Constant), ΔTurn, ΔROI, ΔCash, Marg2011. 
 
Table 3. Coefficientsa 
 
Model 
Unstand. Coeff. Stand.Coeffi. 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .026 .024  1.086 .280 
ΔTurn -.264 .086 -.285 -3.081 .003 
ΔROI -1.970 .397 -.479 -4.963 .000 
ΔCash .071 .022 .301 3.276 .001 
Marg2011 3.878E-18 .007 .306 3.612 .000 
 
Empirical evidence shows the all the variables 
observed significantly influence the ratio of related 
revenues to the total, since their p-value is between 
0.05 and 0.01. 
The results in Table 3 show a negative relation 
between a fluctuation in turnover and the intensity of 
RP revenues. Companies with  a fall in turnover 
between 2010 and 2011, in 2011, had the highest RP 
revenue intensity. 
The same association is true of corporate 
profitability. A reduction in profitability seems to 
induce companies to declare more revenues from 
RPTs. 
Table 3 shows a positive association between the 
difference of Net Cash Flow and the intensity of RP 
revenues. There are two outputs: the first suggests that 
it would be interesting to extend this type of analysis 
to the financial dimension of RPTs, and, the second 
may suggest that RP revenues are used to inject 
liquidity into firms. This may be useful for the firm, 
but at the same time it subordinates these transactions 
to solely a financial necessity. There is also a positive 
association between Marg2011 and the intensity of 
RP revenues.  
Tables 4 and 5 evaluate the multicollinearity 
problem. 
 
Table 4. VIF 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
ΔTurn .788 1.269 
ΔROI .724 1.380 
ΔCash .801 1.248 
Marg2011 .944 1.059 
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Table 5 – Multicollinearity index 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index 
1 1 1.909 1.000 
2 1.613 1.088 
3 .660 1.701 
4 .479 1.996 
5 .339 2.374 
VIF values in Table 4 are low and suggest that 
there are no correlations between independent 
variables. Furthermore, in Table 5, the 
multicollinearity index is also slow in confirming the 
adequateness of the model. 
 
 
Table 6. Heteroscedasticity 
 
 
 
Table 6 shows that our model is not affected by 
heteroscedasticity. 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
As suggested in the literature, RPTs can be used to 
carry out abuse with conflicts of interest between 
ownership and control or between majority and 
minority shareholders. These transactions are subject 
to moral hazard, and hence are characterized by a 
greater inherent risk than other transactions. 
Regulators have recently strengthened existing rules, 
introducing new bans and requirements, aimed at 
guaranteeing the substantive and economic fairness of 
these transactions. 
The aim of the regulatory process is to guarantee 
the proper use of RPTs. This paper provides evidence 
of the potential risk of these operations. Focusing on 
the revenues made with RPs, we investigated the 
relation between business trends and the intensity of 
RP revenues in Income Statements.  
The first variable considered is the difference in 
profitability. Specifically, we investigated the 
relationship between the difference in ROI (return on 
investments) and the intensity of RP revenues. Our 
analysis responds to the first RQ with positive 
evidence. There is a statistically negative association 
between  ROI trends and the intensity of RP revenues. 
This is a sign of potential danger because companies 
that are losing profitability are more likely to turn to 
RPs for revenues. 
The second element that we took into account is 
the difference in turnover between 2010 and 2011. A 
fall in turnover is clearly a major concern for a 
corporation. It may be caused by a problem in the 
effectiveness of outputs or by adverse environmental 
and economic conditions. Obviously, in light of the 
importance of fixed costs in Italian Income 
Statements, a reduction in turnover can threaten the 
continuation of the business. 
Our analysis responds to the second RQ with 
positive evidence. There is a statistically negative 
association between turnover trend and the intensity 
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of RP revenues. This may also be read as a warning 
because companies that lose turnover are more likely 
to turn to RPs for revenue. These results partially 
justify the recent tightening in rules. 
We also tested the intensity of RP revenues 
against two other variables: the variation of Net Free 
Cash Flow and the EBITDA margin. 
There is a positive association between 
Marg2011 and the intensity of RP revenues. This 
suggests that companies with a higher margin 
generate more revenues with RPs. This positive 
association suggests that RPTs may be instruments to 
increase corporate profitability. Indeed, they may be 
carried out at conditions that differ from normal 
market conditions to cover a reduction in margins. As 
is known, this is one of the main risks associated with 
RP transactions. Many could be carried out without  a 
genuine economic reason. 
The cash flow trend needs to verify the relation 
between RP revenues and the financial position of the 
firm. The study highlights a positive association 
between these variables. This suggests that companies 
with a better financial position between 2010 and 
2011 are more likely to generate revenue from  RPs.  
This positive association produces two different 
outputs: the first suggests that it may be interesting in 
future research to expand this analysis to the financial 
dimension of RPTs (for instance considering related 
cash flow values), and the second underlines that RP 
revenues are used to inject liquidity into corporations 
(a binomial correlation may be found). This may be 
useful for corporations but at the same time it could 
relegate these transactions to solely financial 
necessity.  
These two results are realted because a higher 
EBITDA margin may produce an increase in cash 
flow.  
This study provides a starting point for future 
research, which could extend our analysis (dealing 
only with economic effects) to include financial 
effects and consider other elements that are influenced 
by the intensity of RP revenues.  
In future research we intend to expand this 
sample and, at the same time, in line with the 
literature, include in the model control variables better 
able to explain the effects produced by independent 
variables and to reduce error . This paper considers  
the intensity of RP revenues in 2011, and it may be of 
interest to analyze the same association with a trend in 
RP revenues. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
 
1 A.S. ROMA SPA 
2 A2A S.P.A. 
3 ACEA S.P.A. 
4 ACOTEL GROUP SOCIETA' PER AZIONI 
5 ACSM-AGAM S.P.A. 
6 AEDES SPA 
7 AEFFE S.P.A. 
8 AEROPORTO DI FIRENZE S.P.A. 
9 AMPLIFON S.P.A. 
10 ANSALDO STS S.P.A. 
11 ARNOLDO MONDADORI EDITORE SPA 
12 ASCOPIAVE S.P.A. 
13 ASTALDI S.P.A. 
14 ATLANTIA S.P.A. 
15 AUTOGRILL S.P.A. 
16 AUTOSTRADE MERIDIONALI S.P.A. 
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Appendix 1- Continued 
 
17 B. & C. SPEAKERS - SOCIETA' PER AZIONI 
18 BASIC NET S.P.A. 
19 BASTOGI S.P.A. 
20 BE S.P.A. 
21 BEGHELLI S.P.A. 
22 BEST UNION COMPANY S.P.A. 
23 BIESSE S.P.A. 
24 BREMBO S.P.A. 
25 BUZZI UNICEM S.P.A.  
26 CAIRO COMMUNICATION S.P.A. 
27 CALTAGIRONE EDITORE S.P.A. 
28 CEMBRE S.P.A. 
29 CEMENTIR HOLDING S.P.A. 
30 CIR S.P.A.  
31 COFIDE - GRUPPO DE BENEDETTI S.P.A. 
32 DANIELI & C. S.P.A. 
33 DATALOGIC S.P.A. 
34 DAVIDE CAMPARI-MILANO S.P.A.  
35 DE' LONGHI S.P.A. 
36 DIASORIN S.P.A. 
37 EL.EN. - S.P.A. 
38 EMAK S.P.A. 
39 ENEL - SPA 
40 ENEL GREEN POWER S.P.A. 
41 ENGINEERING - INGEGNERIA INFORMATICA - S.P.A. 
42 ENI S.P.A. 
43 ERG S.P.A. 
44 ESPRINET S.P.A. 
45 FALCK RENEWABLES S.P.A. 
46 FIERA MILANO S.P.A. 
47 FINCANTIERI S.P.A. 
48 FINMECCANICA S.P.A. 
49 FNM S.P.A. 
50 GEOX S.P.A. 
51 GRUPPO EDIT ORIALE L'ESPRESSO S.P.A. SI 
52 HERA S.P.A. 
53 IGD SIIQ S.P.A. 
54 IMA S.P.A. 
55 IMMSI S.P.A. 
56 INTERPUMP GROUP S.P.A. 
57 IREN S.P.A. 
58 ITALCEMENTI FABBRICHE RIUNITE CEMENTO S.P.A.  
59 ITALMOBILIARE SPA 
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Appendix 1 - Continued 
 
60 JUVENTUS F.C. - S.P.A.  
61 LA DORIA - S.P.A. 
62 LUXOTTICA GROUP SPA 
63 MAIRE TECNIMONT S.P.A. 
64 MARR S.P.A. 
65 MEDIASET S.P.A. 
66 NICE S.P.A. 
67 OLIDATA S.P.A. 
68 PARMALAT S.P.A. 
69 PIAGGIO & C. S.P.A. 
70 PIRELLI & C. S.P.A. 
71 PRADA S.P.A. 
72 PRELIOS S.P.A. 
73 PRIMA INDUSTRIE - S.P.A. 
74 PRYSMIAN S.P.A. 
75 RCS S.P.A. 
76 RECORDATI INDUSTRIA CHIMICA E FARMACEUTICA S.P.A. 
77 REPLY S.P.A. 
78 RISANAMENTO SPA 
79 SABAF S.P.A. 
80 SAFILO GROUP S.P.A. 
81 SAIPEM S.P.A. 
82 SALVATORE FERRAGAMO S.P.A. 
83 SARAS S.P.A. 
84 SAVE S.P.A. 
85 SEAT PAGINE GIALLE S.P.A. 
86 SERVIZI ITALIA S.P.A. 
87 SNAI S.P.A. 
88 SNAM S.P.A. 
89 SOCIETA' INIZIATIVE AUTOSTRADALI E SERVIZI S.P.A. 
90 SOGEFI S.P.A. 
91 SOL S.P.A. 
92 SORIN SPA 
93 TAMBURI INVESTMENT PARTNERS S.P.A.  
94 TELECOM ITALIA SPA 
95 TERNA S.P.A. 
96 TOD'S S.P.A. 
97 TREVI - FINANZIARIA INDUSTRIALE S.P.A. 
98 VIANINI LAVORI - S.P.A 
99 YOOX S.P.A. 
100 ZIGNAGO VETRO S.P.A.  
 
 
  
